"Significant missed opportunity" to take action that might have prevented arena attack," report finds
Intelligence that could have led to the security services keeping a closer eye on the bomber wasn't shared quickly enough
Last updated 2nd Mar 2023
A report looking into whether a terror attack at an Ariana Grande concert at Manchester Arena could have been prevented has found there was a "significant missed opportunity" to take action that might have prevented the atrocity.
22 people were killed in May 2017 when Salman Abedi detonated a bomb as people were leaving the concert.
Today the third and final report from the Manchester Arena Inquiry, which was set up in 2019 to assess the failings leading up to and on the night of the attack, has been released.
In it, the inquiry's chairman, Sir John Saunders, details how he thinks a failure in sharing intelligence about Salman Abedi was a missed opportunity which could have led to action which may have prevented the attack.
In the months before the attack, two pieces of intelligence about Abedi were received by the security service but their significance "was not fully appreciated at the time."
One security officer, who was the first to see these pieces of intelligence "had difficulty assessing the significance" of them and neither of those pieces of intelligence, which the report says could have indicated potential terrorist activity, was shared with counter-terror police in the North West.
The report also says the intelligence should have been discussed with other security officers and a report should have been written on it "on the same day." That in turn, the inquiry has found, would have led to a "potentially important investigative action" which "would have provided an opportunity to gather evidence on Abedi."
However, inquiry chairman, Sir John Saunders, also writes:
"It is not possible to reach any conclusion on the balance of probabilities to any other evidential standard as to whether the attack would have been prevented, however, there was a realistic possibility that actionable intelligence could have been obtained which might have led to actions preventing the attack.
"The reasons for this significant opportunity missed opportunity included a decision by a security service officer not to act swiftly enough."
Schools, Colleges and Universities "not at fault"
The inquiry also found, whilst none of the schools, colleges or universities Abedi attended were at fault for not identifying Abedi as being at risk of being drawn into terrorism if a better system was in place for them to share information as he moved from one institution to another, the warning signs may have been more obvious.
One such sign was when a teacher at Trafford College saw an image of Abedi holding a gun but upon questioning from school staff Abedi explained he had family and Tripoli and "had done a lot of shooting there."
Sir John Saunders writes: "No single institution had a comprehensive-enough view of SA's behaviour, family situation or potential risk factors, over a sufficiently long period of time, to recognise his descent into violent Islamist extremism."
Abedi visited a convicted terrorist in prison
The report raises concerns about how Abedi was able to communicate with a convicted terrorist who was serving a five-and-a-half-year jail sentence.
Sir John Saunders says "Abdalraouf Abdallah" played an "important role" in Abedi's radicalisation. The pair had exchanged 1,000 text messages in November 2014 however upon Abdallah's arrest, Abedi was not identified as the person he had been communicating with.
Abdallah and Abedi continued to have a relationship while Abdallah was in prison with Abedi visiting him and the pair staying in touch over a mobile phone Abdallah had whilst in prison before it was seized by prison authorities in February 2017.
However, it took the authorities nearly four months until the full set of data from that phone was seized on the 1st of June 2017. However, the report finds that this was not something that can be attributed to the cause of the attack.
Sir John Saunders writes "The delay in containing the data relating to these calls did not have any causative significance. This is because the number Abedi used was not attributed to him until the extensive investigation conducted after the attack.
"However, it was a concerning delay. Potential intelligence about a prisoner serving a sentence for terrorism offences and known to be a potential radicaliser should be obtained and analysed more quickly."
Recommendations
The inquiry has presented several recommendations including giving inquiry chairs more power to ensure relevant witnesses are interviewed and give evidence. It's after Ismail Abedi fled the country after the attack and therefore didn't participate in the inquiry.
There should be a new system to reduce the risk of extremist prisoners radicalising those who visit them. The report notes that the current method of identifying the risks prisoners posed is based on the risk of them escaping.
Instead, the report suggests there should be a "robust assessment of the risk a prisoner poses for the radicalisation of others" which should include "controls such as prohibiting vulnerable visitors where justified or ensuring conversations are supervised."
It's also recommended that there should be a better way for schools and colleges to keep track of signs that could indicate someone could be at risk of radicalisation. The report says the Department for Education should "consider whether schools should include notes of any significant behavioural problems which follow a student when they move school."
Further recommendations, which cannot be published for national security reasons, as set to be discussed with the security services.