Something went wrong with emergency response to arena attack, inquiry told

A retired senior officer could think of "no circumstance'' in which police thought an active terrorist gunman may be on the loose but would not tell the other main emergency services, an inquiry has heard.

Former Greater Manchester Police (GMP) superintendent Craig Thompson took over the role of tactical firearms commander from the force duty officer (FDO) on the night of the Manchester Arena bombing in May 2017 in which 22 people were killed.

Operation Plato, a pre-planned response to a suspected marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA), was declared about 15 minutes after the blast following reports - later proved false - of gunfire and gunshot wounds.

But FDO Inspector Dale Sexton, operating from the force HQ control room, did not inform North West Ambulance Service or Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service.

The public inquiry into the attack at the end of an Ariana Grande concert has been told that consequently a forward command point where all three blue light services meet to co-ordinate a joint emergency response was not set up.

Firefighters trained in enhanced first aid with specialist equipment and stretchers did not arrive until two hours after the blast detonated by suicide bomber Salman Abedi in the City Room foyer, the inquiry has heard, while only three paramedics entered the City Room.

Mr Thompson, who is head of security and stadium safety at Manchester United, agreed with counsel to the inquiry Paul Greaney QC that "obviously something went wrong'' with the joint response on the night.

He said the Plato plan was "all about informing partners, ensuring that's communicated and then co-location'' but added in his personal view "sometimes policy and procedure can get in the way''.

Mr Thompson admitted it was a mistake that GMP did not declare a major incident until 1am - two-and-a-half hours after the explosion.

He told the inquiry: "I think with a major incident you get probably a different response from different sets of assets. It probably gives you better ground tactical command of unarmed staff ... and it probably gives you certain assets around things like casualty bureau.''

He agreed with Mr Greaney that it "puts a structure in place'' and added that it would sit separately to the Plato response.

He said: "If it's a major incident at 1am it was certainly a major incident at 10.45pm.''

Mr Thompson confirmed he was not informed of communication problems highlighted a year earlier at a ljve MTFA training exercise in a shopping centre in which the emergency services were unable to contact the FDO and there was a lengthy delay before the fire service arrived on scene.

He said he was also unaware of a police inspectorate report before the Arena bombing which warned the GMP FDO would be "quickly overburdened'' by the sheer number of tasks they were expected to carry out in the early stages of an MTFA.

He took over the command role from Mr Sexton at 12.15am on May 23 but stated it was the "earliest opportunity'' to do so as he was unable to get through to his phone line before then.

Richard Horwell QC, representing Greater Manchester Police, asked: "Would you have ever imagined that an FDO would declare Plato but not inform the other emergency services?''

Mr Thompson said: "No, sir. I could never think of a circumstance when that would happen.''

Mr Horwell said: "Did that cross your mind on the night?''

The witness replied: "No, it never crossed my mind, sir.''

Earlier this month, Mr Sexton told the inquiry he went against guidance and decided to keep Operation Plato "secret'' so that paramedics, unarmed police and members of the public helping the injured would not be withdrawn from a "hot zone'' in which only armed officers should operate.

The inquiry continues.